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Many farmers ask, "Is there a better way to sell
°!.1r products in world markets?" They hear about
glant international marketing combines, government
t,raders,_ commodity agreements, marketing boards,
luternational cartels, etc. How do these systems
compare with the way America's farm products are
_Illarketed internationally today? There is a choice.
Farmers, agricultural leaders, policy makers, and
Others need to learn more about these alternatives to
'take intelligent choices. This publication describes
arid analyzes some of the alternative international
Iparketing systems that could be adopted by the U.S.
'arm community and presents important public policy
considerations for each. None of the alternatives dis-
cussed are new; each has been tried or is being used
somewhere as a means of influencing world trade.
GOALS FOR INTERNATIONAL
MARKETING POLICY
Marketing methods may be chosen- for numerous
reasons. Reasons that appear to be particularly im-
Portant to the U.S. farm community, and that provide
a conunon basis for evaluating alternatives, include:
(1) Demand Expansion. Expansion of export de-
41and continues to be a primary goal of U.S. inter-
11. ational marketing policy. Export demand expansion
is a way of strengthening producer prices. It is also
critical to general economic goals such as maintaining
a favorable balance of trade and stabilizing the value
of the dollar.
(2) Market Assurance. The desire to assure ex-
°rt markets strengthens as world food supply and
buemand slips, between deficit and surplus conditions.
rarniers in exporting countries want stable markets
even in years of surplus production while importing
e.,olultries desire assured supply even if deficit pro-
'motion exists.
(3) Producer Prices. For the producer the bottom
line is price. Policies that raise and stabilize price
are viewed favorably. Those that reduce price, such as
embargoes, are unpopular.
(4) Rationing Available Supplies. The years
P7 2-74 taught the world that our food supply cannot
°a taken for granted. A means must exist for rationing
c°111modities when shortages occur. Consumption
Priorities, food reserves, and the distribution of food-
aid dollars have become important issues.
ALTERNATIVE 1: THE CURRENT U.S. SYSTEM
The most logical starting point for evaluating
alternative international marketing methods is the cur-
rn.t export marketing system for U.S. farm products.
"us can be described as a competitive, free enter-
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prise system with, relatively little centralized control
or direction at the hands of either government or pro-
ducer groups. As such, the system .generally is con-
sistent with the way domestic business is done in the
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U.S., but it is an anomaly in international trade
where centralized decisionmaking by the world's
trading nations is common. It is this disparity between
the "American way" and methods of international
marketing used by numerous other countries that
often generates criticism, perhaps unfair, of the
existing system.
Much of the worldwide marketing of U.S. farm
products is done by a relatively small number of
private firms such as Cargill Incorporated, Continental
Grain Company, and Louis Dreyfus Corporation.
Smaller firms and farmer-owned cooperatives also do
some international merchandising, particularly of
fruits, vegetables, and nuts, and are key parts of the
system that assembles all farm products and prepares
them for international shipment. For the most part,
U.S. firms are free to deal with world customers on
business terms, subject mainly to the general trade
policies of the U.S. such as tariffs, quotas, em-
bargoes, and preferential trading agreements with
certain foreign nations.
The U.S. government does perform numerous
functions, however, which generally facilitate the in-
ternational trade of American firms, but which do not
substitute for private enterprise and decisionmaldng.
Considerable intermediate- and long-term credit is
provided to foreign customers who do not have com-
mercial borrowing power. Federal grading and in-
spection services help assure accurate description
and high quality of exported products. Agricultural
attaches and others collect considerable foreign mar-
ket information and make it available to American
firms. Technical assistance in the use of products is
provided in many foreign countries which helps create
future demand for U.S. farm products. Government,
producers, and industry jointly sponsor numerous pro-
grams to promote and merchandise U.S. farm products
abroad. And, federally financed grain reserve pro-.
grams help maintain a supply of exportable com-
modities.
These various activities may be viewed as a part-
nership between government and industry to
develop and expand foreign markets. But, most of the
basic marketing decisions — to whom to sell, what to
sell, at what price, when, etc. — are private decisions
with few if any central or industry-wide directions.
Impacts
The analysis of the performance of the current
U.S. system for agricultural export marketing is rela-
tively straightforward, because considerable expe-
rience exists.
Demand Expansion. The profit-motivated, free
enterprise system puts considerable incentive on
successful market expansion. This incentive to expand
markets is probably greater than with any other sys-
tem. Additionally, the joint private industry-govern-
ment market development program is generally con-
sidered the most aggressive program in world markets.
This has been a key factor in maintaining and expand-
ing exports of U.S. farm products without initiating
the sharp price-cutting tactics often used by other
exporting nations. At the same time, the general lack
of central control allows price flexibility necessary
to remain competitive in the international market.
Market, Assurance. The incentive for exporters
to expand their market helps maintain marketing
opportunities for farmers. However, the U.S. often
becomes a residual supplier in world markets, given
the relatively small use of long-term trade agree-
ments in the current system. Thus, nothing inherent
in this system guarantees that producers will find a
ready market for all or even a specified portion of
their output, particularly when world market supplies
are plentiful. When supplies are tight, producers are
likewise threatened by the possibility of export em-
bargoes if government officials perceive domestic
prices to be "too high."
Producer Prices. In a competitive, open market
system, U.S. prices and world trade prices for com-
modities tend to be jointly determined. However,
because the U.S. is the only major "decentralized"
trading nation, it typically experiences greater price
fluctuation and uncertainty then exists within many
other countries that operate in international markets.
This can result in high prices when world market
supplies are tight but provide no price floor at other
times.
Rationing Available Supplies. The current exports
system depends on market-determined prices to ration
short supplies among alternative customers and mar-
ket shares among alternative sellers. The price system
works pretty well as a rationing mechanism as long
as we are willing to accept the principle that buyers
with the most money get the biggest share of the
supply and sellers with the lowest costs get the most
business.
Policy Implications
Little direct change in public policy is necessarY
to maintain the existing system for export marketing.
The U.S. could be an even more aggressive competitor
with an expanded joint industry-government foreigl
market development program. New federal legisla-
tion facilitating producer check-off programs to helP
finance such joint efforts is one possibility. pro-
hibiting export embargoes would remove the ull"
certainty of untoward government intervention. Also,
the present international marketing system is bene-
fitted by a policy of economic assistance to less
developed countries (LDC's)' which helps create long-
term demand for U.S. farm products.
ALTERNATIVE 2: LONG-TERM, BILATERAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS
A long-term, bilateral trade agreement is a con-
tract between two traders and/or governments t°
purchase and supply specified farm products. Long'
term agreements are distinguished from export sales
within a crop year or from one crop year into the
next.
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While emphasizing the quantity of commodities
to be traded, long-term agreements also frequently
contain provisions for exchange of information on
crop conditions as well as anticipated changes in
Product needs throughout the crop year. This facili-
tates more orderly marketing and price movements.
Probably the most widely recognized example of
a long-term, bilateral trade agreement is the U.S.-
grin agreement. It provides that each yearfOr 5 years the U.S.S.R. will purchase at least 6 million
tons of grain from the U.S. and that the U.S. stands
ready to supply up to 8 million tons with price to be
negotiated between the Soviet government and the U.S.
trading firm handling the sales. Larger quantities
may be purchased depending on U.S. supply con-
ditions. It also provides for exchange of information
Oil crop conditions and anticipated import needs on a
regular basis. Government-to-government agreements
alSO exist between the U.S. and Japan as well as the
nego-
tiated 
U.S. and Poland. A similar agreement has been 
with the People's Republic of China.
Such trade agreements need not be limited to
governments. For example, a U.S. grain cooperative
and a Japanese cooperative have a multiyear trade
agreement on the sale of grain.
Opportunities for expansion of long-term, bilateral
trade agreements may increase in the future.Governments, private firms, or combinations thereof
41aY participate in such agreements. Performance on.
agreements is likely to be enhanced when govern-
Ments either participate directly or stand behind
Private agreements. Performance may, however, be
affected by the status of foreign relations between
the Countries involved. For example, a return to a cold
,war policy between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would
Jeopardize the current long-term grain agreement that
exists between these nations.
Impacts
Because of both the current involvement of theS. in long-term agreements and the considerable
Interest that surfaces periodically in the farm com-
1411111, itY, the results of such agreements deserve care-
1t Consideration.
Demand Expansion. Although not the primary pur-
1_3,ose, long-term trade- agreements can expand export
ernand over time. Demand expansion occurs be-
luse of the trading relationships established during
a tmg-term agreement.
Marketing Assurance. The main benefit of a long-
term trade agreement is assurance for the buyer of a
'A111rce of supply and for the seller of a market outlet.
t'greements thus tend to create a specific set of
trLading Patterns. Although this has advantages to bothtfie buyer and seller, markets may be foreclosed to(nose who are not parties to the agreement.
Producer Prices. Long-term agreements are not
!:',flrnarily a tool of price enhancement. However,
'a2re stable prices may result from a more stable
ud Predictable demand during the period of the4greement.
Rationing Available Supplies. Long-term trade
agreements provide food to those countries that are
in a position to negotiate an agreement. They may
deny it to those that are not. It would seem that those
buying countries in the best position to negotiate a
long-term trade agreement are the relatively wealthy
nations with adequate hard currency exchange. On
the other hand, several LDC's are parties to such
agreements.
Policy Implications
Long-term agreements result from a need by im-
porting and exporting nations. Interest by importing
countries logically increases when supplies are short.
The Trade Act of 1974 and its predecessors provides
authority for the U.S. to enter into long-term trade
agreements. Despite this authority, policy questions
continue to arise, particularly in periods of short
supply. These questions usually relate to which coun-
tries receive priority access to available U.S. supplies.
Once an agreement is made with one country, the
desire by other countries for similar agreements
tends to increase.
ALTERNATIVE 3: INTERNATIONAL
COMMODITY AGREEMENTS
International commodity agreements are multi-
lateral accords among governments affecting inter-
national terms of trade. Commodity agreements
generally have one or more of three basic objectives:
(a) stabilizing price, (b) raising price, and/or (c)
assuring supplies. To accomplish these objectives,
three provisions often are part of an agreement:
(1) Provision for a price range within which
transactions may occur. This establishes a
minimum price at which buyers may buy and
a maximum price at which sellers may. sell.
The crucial variables are the level and range
of the price corridor within which transactions
may occur.
(2) Provision for the holding and release of buffer
stocks, frequently referred to as an inter-
national reserve. In such agreements, parties
hold stocks at agreed-upon levels. Costs of
holding such buffer stocks may be shared in
proportion to the stocks held by each country
or allocated among the participating countries.
(3) Provision for control of production in ac-
cordance with market needs and price objec-
tives. Effectiveness in controlling production
requires joint participation and coordination
of domestic production policies, such as the
set-aide in the U.S., on the part of all major
exporting countries. In the case of wheat, for
example, this would include at least the U.S.,
Canada, Australia, Argentina, and France.
These countries would be required to agree
on the total quantity of wheat desired as
well as the appropriate market shares for
each country. Although such agreement is dis-
cussed frequently, enforceable production con-
trol provisions are extremely difficult to de-
velop and maintain.
Interest in international commodity agreements
increases when substantial surpluses lead to low
prices. The thrust then becomes one of finding a way
to establish price floors and spread the burden of
adjustment among the major exporting countries.
Thus, at least until recently, commodity agreements
appeared to be largely of interest to the major agri-
cultural exporting countries.
The interest of Third World countries in com-
modity agreements has been fostered by United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Active promotion of agreements in commodities pro-
duced by Third World countries has been an integral
part of UNCTAD policies since the early 1970's.
Impacts
Commodity agreements are, in part, a way to
reduce competition among the major exporters and
importers of the commodity subject to the agreement.
Specific impacts reflect this overall purpose.
Demand Expansion. Demand expansion is not a
major consideration in these agreements. If prices
are increased, demand may actually decline par-
ticularly where good substitute products are available.
If the thrust of the agreement is toward buffer stocks,
increased stability of price and food security may
expand demand modestly.
Market Assurance. Commodity agreements do not
explicitly provide assured markets for particular
countries. However, with reduced price competition
provided by price floors and ceilings and the forum
provided for increased contact among exporters, the
basis for division of markets among exporting coun-
tries may be enhanced.
Producer Prices. Historically, the prime objective
of commodity agreements has been the negotiation
of a floor price above that which would exist in the
free market during times of surpluses. However, tight
supplies in the early 1970's shifted the attention of
importing countries to the issue of ceiling prices. In
addition, there is concern that the floor price not be
raised so high as to curtail demand.
The success of international commodity agree-
ments in enhancing price is much debated. Inter-
national wheat agreements negotiated between wheat
exporting and importing nations were successful as
long as supplies were not overly burdensome and the
price that would exist in the free market was close to
the specified range. However, when substantial sur-
pluses accumulated, incentives for countries to reduce
price began to build and the agreements frequently
broke down.
Rationing Available Supplies. In the early 1970's,
buffer stocks became a central issue in commodity
agreement discussions. However, exporting countries
never really became serious about the buffer stock
demands of importing countries until surpluses began
to accumulate. Government stocks then became an
acceptable means of supporting sagging world prices.
Policy Implications
As in the case of long-term trade agreements,
the Trade Act of 1974 provides authority for the
President to enter into international commodity agree-
ments. The agreements themselves are the product of
negotiation among exporting and importing countries.
Policies to implement effective agreements must, how-
ever, be broader than the 1974 Act. Domestic policies
such as those affecting export prices, production, and
stocks must be coordinated with the provisions of the
agreement in each participating country. Such inter-
national policy coordination makes implementation
particularly difficult.
ALTERNATIVE 4: INTERNATIONAL CARTELS
Since the oil producing nations increased world
prices through OPEC, interest has grown in agricul-
ture for developing an OPEC strategy or cartel among
the major grain exporting countries. Such a cartel
could be viewed as an international commodity agree-
ment involving only exporting countries.
Four factors are necessary for the success of
such a strategy:
(1) Agreement among exporters on the price level
and adherence to the established level.
(2) Provision for sharing markets in the distribu-
tion of sales among nations.
(3) Provisions for gearing production in the par-
ticipating countries to sales levels and market
shares.
(4) The long run absence of, or control by the
cartel of, production in other nonmember
countries.
The incentive for entering such a cartel is clearlY
one of price enhancement. Canada, Australia, and
certain U.S. producer segments have charged that
U.S. policies needlessly hold down the world price
as part of a "cheap food" policy. They contend that
the U.S. is the major price leader in world agricultural
markets, thus, if the U.S. only would raise its price,
other exporting governments would follow. Realis-
tically, however, the U.S. probably would price itself
out of the market unless the other countries made
an explicit agreement to follow the U.S. price lead.
All major exporting countries would have to par-
ticipate in a cartel to make it effective. In addition,
domestic policies of these countries would have to be
coordinated to accomplish the agreed-upon price
levels, trade patterns, and production controls. In the
case of wheat, for example, this would require agree-
ment among at least the U.S., Canada, Australia,
Argentina, and France. France's participation raises
some interesting questions. It currently enjoys a near'
monopoly position on wheat sales to other countries
within the European Community (EC). If allowed t°
retain that position as well as enjoy the cartel ben&
fits, it would have the best of both worlds. If re-
quired to give up its favorable EC connection:
France likely would not participate which coulC
render the cartel ineffective.
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Impacts
Evaluations of the impacts of an international
agricultural cartel turn on its basic concept as a
Worldwide selling monopoly. Recent experiences with 
the world oil monopoly (OPEC) are helpful in under-
standing cartel behavior, however impacts in agricul-
ture will differ somewhat because food is produced
ill substantial quantity virtually everywhere.
Demand Expansion. If commodity agreements
Were effective in raising price, the quantity demanded
Would be reduced. Substitution of other food or feed
grains for which a cartel did not exist would probably
occur. -
Market Assurance. The market-sharing feature of
commodity agreements would divide the available
Market among exporting countries. This division would
need to be formalized within the cartel agreement.
Producer Prices. The prime objective of a cartel
Policy is to raise price. While a reduction in exports
Would be expected to result from the higher price,
Producer returns would increase. However, the long-
run effects are more difficult to determine. Higher
Prices create an incentive in importing countries to
seek alternative supply sources. They may do this
either by substituting other products or by creating
an alternative supply source. Japanese assistance in
the development of soybean production potential in
brazil is illustrative of an importing country trying to
develop alternative supply sources. The ability to
levelop such alternatives will influence directly the
long-run effectiveness of the cartel.
Rationing Available Supplies. A cartel allocates
suPPlies to those with the greatest ability to pay. This
can affect the domestic as well as foreign markets.
Several interesting questions can be raised: Would the
U.S. consumer be willing to pay the price associated
with a cartel policy? Would the general public accept
the concept of raising farm prices to the detriment
of the less developed countries? Would the U.S. pro-
ducer accept the regimentation of production and
Marketing programs involved in a cartel policy?
13°1icy Implications
. Participation in a cartel would force major changes
til  U.S. policy about agricultural exports. Effective
.S. participation would require centralization of
xPort decisions, as well as production decisions,
111 a single agency such as a marketing board. That
encY would need control over virtually all supply-,
slice-, and demand-related farm programs affecting
e cartel commodity. In addition, an international
urganization of countries exporting the cartel com-
42°dItY would be needed to make cartel decisions,
Ud ethe U.S. would have to adopt a policy of sub-8ervience to that organization.
41.A ,TERNA'TIVE 5: MARKETING BOARDS
'IAD ORDERS
Conceptually, marketing boards and marketing
urders are similar. They both are means of establish-
ing compulsory industry-wide or market-wide control
over market activities. They differ in where they have
been used and in the way mandatory control is
exercised.
No current legal framework exists in the United
States for marketing boards. Boards are used exten-
sively for agricultural export marketing in other
countries, including Canada, Australia, and South
Africa. On the other hand, marketing orders are a
uniquely American institution. Federal orders have
been authorized for fresh and dried fruits and
vegetables, nuts, and milk since enactment of the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, and
numerous orders have been implemented. These have
not been used for export marketing but as domestic
market control devices.
With market orders, market-wide control is exer-
cised through cooperation between the federal govern-
ment and producers of the regulated commodity. Gen-
erally, both producers and the government participate
in a government-supervised decisionmaldng process.
Once a recommended decision has the majority sup-.
port of both producers and the governmental over-
seeing agency, the Secretary of Agriculture orders the
related action for all participants in the market. The
process is different for marketing boards. Boards
typically are composed of farmers who are chosen by
all producers of a specified commodity, usually in
accordance with a government-specified selection pro-
cedure. Nonproducer representatives may be included.
Generally board decisions are final and binding upon.
all market participants, perhaps subject to govern-
mental override in some instances.
Because of the lack of existing legislation, U.S.
farmers can use neither marketing boards nor orders
to appreciably influence their export market (orders,
because existing authority generally does not extend
to the export market and is limited to commodities
which do not constitute the bulk of U.S. farm exports,
and boards, since no authorizing legislation exists).
However, given appropriate legislation, both are
feasible means for U.S. farmers to gain greater
collective influence over the export marketing of
their products.
Although not unique to the order or board
mechanism, numerous functions can be accomplished
which can have significant impact upon the inter-
national marketing of U.S. farm products. Informa-
tion on the worldwide supply situations and other
market conditions can be collected, analyzed, and
disseminated to the U.S. industry. Promotion and
other foreign market development activities can be
financed and implemented. Research can be com-
missioned that could lead to greater utilization of
U.S. farm products abroad. Uniform standards for
product identification, quality classification, weigh-
ing, packaging, and so on could be instituted industry-
wide to help gain broader acceptance of U.S. products
in world markets. Seasonal or multiyear pools could
be engaged to reduce price variations received by
producers relative to variations in world market
prices. Production or marketing quotas could be
5
established for individual producers to reduce the
negative impact of large, uncontrolled market sup-
plies on prices. Buffer stocks could be maintained
to smooth out available supplies from year to year.
Price-setting authority could be granted to the board
or order. Combined with quota authority, price-
setting could be used to significantly alter farmers'
receipts from export marketing.
In essence, just about any action affecting
farmers' export market could be made collectively
through boards and/or orders. Experience in several
nations has shown that virtually any commodity group
or industry could find a means to use the market-wide
control features of these mechanisms relative to
their export market. For example, the Australian
Wheat Board markets all Australian-produced wheat,
both domestically and internationally. The Canadian
Wheat Board has authority for all export marketing,
pools sales receipts, and can allocate marketing
quotas to individual farmers. The Australian Meat
Board regulates meat exports through export licenses
and engages in market development and promotion.
The South Africa Maize Board is the sole buyer of
corn in that country and conducts all export market-
ing. In reality, a large share of the world's major
agricultural exporting nations uses these types of
control mechanisms.
Impacts
It is useful to examine the most likely impacts of
using the board or order approach to international
marketing to help decide whether it is in the best
interest of the U.S. in general and U.S. farmers in
particular to adapt these mechanisms for export
purposes.
Demand Expansion. The primary function of inter-
national marketing boards or orders is to sell available
supplies at the best price. Market expansion itself
is often of secondary concern; efforts made to sell in
large volume more frequently focus on price-cutting
than on long-term market development. More emphasis
also tends to be placed upon control of supplies to
coordinate marketings with anticipated or negotiated
demand. Although these mechanisms can be used to
facilitate long-term market expansion, experiences in
other countries suggest that the results of such efforts
tend to be modest.
Market Assurance. By regulating the flow of farm
commodities to foreign markets and through supply
management practices such as buffer stocks and pro-
duction coordination, foreign buyers could get supply
assurances. Boards could make long-term export
agreements, or orders could be used to provide the
domestic supply management necessary to fulfill
government-negotiated commitments. To the extent
that long-term agreements result, U.S. producers
would gain certainty of future sales opportunities.
Producer Prices. These mechanisms offer con-
siderable potential to improve producer prices. Coor-
dinated industry-wide sales decisions mean that sales
can be timed more easily to correspond with periods
of strong prices. By careful use of marketing or
production quotas, burdensome surpluses can be re-
duced, limiting their downward impact on prices.
By pooling returns, individual producers gain pro-
tection against regularly hitting the market on the
downside. Of course, producers who market regli-
larly on the price peaks probably would not fare
quite as well.
Rationing Available Supplies. These marketing
mechanisms generally mean less individual control
over production, marketing, and supply availabilitY
and more collective, industry-wide decisionmaking.
This reduces reliance upon market prices for allo-
cating products among alternative buyers and makes
it easier to distribute available supplies among more
users, both rich and poor, in periods of short supplY•
However, the tendency is often to shorten supplies
over time to enhance prices rather than to expand
supplies when commercial sales opportunities are
uncertain.
Policy Implications
Implementation of either the marketing board or
order option in agricultural export markets can
occur only with a change in U.S. agricultural market-
ing policy. Substantial extensions would be required
to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937
to make marketing orders applicable to the major
U.S. farm exports. Totally new legislation would be
needed to establish marketing boards for controlling
industry-wide export marketing decisions. This legis-
lation would have to specify the type of authority and
control that the board could exercise and provide a
procedure for farmers to request organization of .a
board and rules to assure representation and fair
conduct.
ALTERNATIVE 6: BARTER
Barter is the exchange of one product for another.
It is the primary means of trade in primivite societies
and the antithesis of our modern monetary exchange
system for both domestic and international trade. Yet,
interest in the barter of agricultural commodities for
other products, particularly "food for crude," continue
to surface. Furthermore, federal laws facilitating bar-
ter suggest that it is a matter of public policy to en-
courage the international barter of U.S. farm products.
The basic arguments for barter focus on the idea of
obtaining strategic materials (such as crude oil) that
are in short supply in the U.S. and high-priced on world
markets in exchange for farm products that are
abundant in the U.S., relatively low priced on world
markets, and perhaps in short supply in countries pro-
ducing oil and other strategic products. Some also
argue that barter offers a means of disposing of sur-
pluses without unduly depressing world market prices
or of avoiding some of the uncertainties associated
with rapid changes in international currency exchange
rates.
A key flaw in such arguments, however, is the
small probability of finding mutually . advantageous
barter situations, that is, another country which has a
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"double coincidence of wants" with U.S. agricultural
exporters. First, most oil-producing nations have rela-
tively small populations and thus need only small
amounts of U.S. farm products, and second, some
Countries with a great need for food have little of value
to offer in exchange.
Imp acts
At best' export barter is a marginal marketing
tool with perhaps some potential to generate exports
not generated by commercial sales.
Demand Expansion. Barter arrangements are used
mainly where commercial sales have limited oppor-
!unity. Thus, barter generally represents new market-
'rigs. The potential to expand agricultural exports by
barter, however, is limited by the infrequent occur-
ence of "double coincidence of wants."
Market Assurance. Barter can, at best, provide
only marginal market assurance to producers. How-
ever, because the federal government is authorized
to barter surplus agricultural commodities for
strategic" materials, this may help facilitiate Com-
modity Credit Corporation operations that indirectly
Provide some degree of market guarantee.
Producer Prices. It is not realistic to anticipate
any impact on prices, because barter sales do not
occur on a monetary basis. It is not the draw of at-
tractive prices that creates such barter sales.
Rationing Available Supplies. Barter is not an
effective rationing mechanism.
Policy Implications
Federal laws, such as the Strategic and Critical
Material Stockpiling Act, the Commodity Credit Cor-
Poration Act, and the Agricultural Development and
Assistance Act, currently authorize barter of agricul-
tural commodities in international trade. However,
little evidence of an effective barter policy can be
found currently in the federal government. Interest
tends to surface during periods of burdensome agri-
cultural surpluses. However, the likelihood of any
major impact is clearly remote.
ALTERNATIVE 7: EXPORT COOPERATIVES
Even though cooperatives originate a large share
of U.S. grain, the four largest cooperative U.S. grain
exporters have a combined market share of only 9
Percent of total U.S. exports. The largest has just 3
Percent. Except for a few specialty products such as
almonds, cooperatives are not a significant factor in
the export market.
The export cooperative alternative would involve
a serious attempt by producers, existing coopera-
tives, and government to put cooperatives on par with
Other major trading companies in the agricultural
exPort market. This would likely require- one of the
following:
(1) Consolidation of domestic cooperative export
activities into the hands of a single coopera-
tive for major commodity groups, such as
grains, including food and feed grains as well
as oilseeds. This would not require a merger
of existing regional grain cooperatives but
only a consolidation of their export opera-
tions.
(2) Establishment of trade agreements between
cooperatives located in the U.S. and foreign
countries. Such agreements already exist on a
small scale between U.S. and Japanese co-
operatives in feed grains and oilseeds.
Establishment of a central sales agency owned
and operated by cooperative importers and
exporters located in different countries. Such
an agency would operate sales contact offices
and an international market information
service in major exporting and importing
countries. The agency would coordinate sales
to both cooperative and noncooperative cus-
tomers throughout the world. It would deal in
products from all exporting countries that had
cooperatives as members of the central sales
agency.
(4) 1stablishment of a multinational export co-
operative owned by cooperatives in different
countries. Such a cooperative would take
direct title to the products handled and be
responsible for the entire sales effort. It
would deal in products of all countries as a
multinational, corporate trading firm.
Any U.S. cooperative handling grain, oilseeds, or
other products could participate in a consolidated
export organization. Present cooperatives controlling
a sufficient volume of grain could establish trading
relations with cooperatives in other countries.
Any importing or exporting cooperative could be-
come a member of either a central sales desk or a
multinational cooperative. The main barrier to such
a development likely would be conflicts of interest
in operating the combined venture among or between
exporting and importing cooperatives.
(3)
Impacts
The impacts of the export cooperative alternative
are somewhat tentative, because they would vary de-
pending upon which organizational options are chosen.
Nonetheless, some general insights are possible.
Demand Expansion. Export cooperatives have as
one principal objective the expansion of their market
share. Accomplishing this can come by either com-
petition with noncooperative trading firms or market
development activities. Market development would
appear to hold particular potential in feed grains
through expansion and improvement of livestock and
poultry production in foreign nations.
Market Assurance. Increased cooperative-to-co-
operative trading, through either trade agreements
between cooperatives, a central sales agent, or a
multinational cooperative, would provide increased.
market assurance for those producers who are co-
operative members.
Producer Prices. Increased producer returns
could be obtained if the cooperative is operated
efficiently. However, such returns, while yielding a
7
satisfactory return on investment, would not likely
substantially increase prices. A greater benefit to
producers could come in terms of spreading risk of
price changes through pooling of returns, improved
information, and more rapid reflection of inter-
national market conditions back to the producer.
This would happen if the cooperative had a good
foreign market information system and reflected that
information back to the producer in more responsive
prices. Pursuing a price enhancement objective would
require unprecedented cooperation between exporting
cooperatives and the marketing boards of various
countries.
Rationing Available -Supplies. Supplies could be
rationed to give preference to members of the inter-
national cooperatives. Such commitments could, how-
ever, still be subject to government interruption such
as embargoes. In addition, as a business operation
that must compete in the market place, any system
of preferences must be economically viable.
Policy Implications
If cooperatives are going to effectively penetrate
export markets, they must be permitted to grow to a
size and market share where they can compete with
noncooperative trading firms as well as deal with
large international buyers, such as governments.
Strong legislation protecting cooperatives' right to
grow will be essential. Increased technical assistance
as well as readily available credit also will be re-
quired.
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
MARKETING ALTERNATIVES
International agricultural marketing policy affects
producers, consumers, governments, and business.
Producers are interested in a policy's effect upon
prices and export sales. Consumer interest arises from
increased food and fiber prices that might result from
certain specific market policies and the availability of
supplies. Business interest arises from the desire to
expand sales and prevent further encroachment by
government in export sales. Government interest
arises from the desire to assure supplies domestically,
improve the balance of payments, control. inflation,
and control the cost of domestic programs. Equally
important is the realization that international trade
policy is part of our foreign policy. For example, a
factor favoring the government's decision to support
a long-term trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. likely
was the detente foreign policy of both nations.
The alternatives discussed cover a spectrum from
those involving only facilitative government action
to those involving considerably higher levels of govern-
ment involvement than currently exists in U.S. agri-
cultural production and international trade. Likewise,
the ability of U.S. producers to achieve implementation
of the alternatives also varies. One method of classi-
fying the alternatives from the standpoint of imple-
mentation is in terms of the type of actions required.
Such actions may be either unilateral, bilateral, or
multilateral.
Unilateral
Unilateral action in international trade can be
initiated by an individual, firm, or government. Much
of the current system of trading involves unilateral
action by private trading companies and by govern-
ments. Unilateral action of U.S. grain cooperatives
could expand export cooperatives.
Unilateral action by government could establish a
marketing board policy. Private grain trade, possibly
including the grain cooperatives, probably would re-
sist such a policy. Each would see its position in the
market changed. It is also difficult to visualize a
marketing board policy being adopted without con-
sumer representation.
Bilateral
Bilateral action involves action by two nations or
entities thereof. Trade agreements and barter fall ill
this category. Bilateral action generally is more diffi-
cult to achieve than unilateral action because both
governments must receive benefits and be convinced of
the need and both must establish supporting policies.
In the case of trade agreements, this might_ be ac-
complished with relative ease in times of shortages,
but would be considerably more difficult if long-term
surpluses develop again.
Multilateral
Commodity agreements, cartels, and multinational
cooperatives involve multilateral action by numerous
entities. Agreement is reached largely by the act of
compromise and common interest. Meaningful agree-
ments are difficult to achieve. They, require rigid
controls and centralization of power if they are to be
effective. The agreements are always subject to the
effects of changes in international tensions, alliances'
and policies. Yet, the potential for enhancing the posi-
tion of producers in domestic and international mar-
kets is probably the greatest in those alternatives that
are the most difficult to achieve and maintain.
These options put substantial additional economic
power in the collective hands of agricultural pro-
ducers. At the same time they reduce the individual
farmer's power to make production and marketing
decisions. Thus, two fundamental policy questions are
involved:
(a) Will the public, through the legislative process,
be willing to grant agricultural producers the
authority to engage industry-wide control over
their export marketing activities? and
(b) Will farmers, if facilitating legislation is en-
acted, be willing to elect a market-wide control
mechanism and thus transfer individual con-
trol over many economic decisions to a grouP
of their representatives?
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expanding Trade
Joseph R. Corley, N. Eugene Engel, and B.F. Stanton
Each year since 1969 the value of U.S. agricultural
exports has increased above the preceding year. In
fact, the trend since World War II has been upward.
like most other sectors of the U.S. economy, trade
expansion has occurred in terms of increased sales for
dollars, more and larger markets for a greater range of
farm products, and a rising value because of increased
demand. In the years following World War II, various
assistance programs ranging from the Marshall Plan
Which provided aid to war-torn nations to the P.L. 480
Program which assists developing nations around the
globe have contributed to trade expansion.
Subsidized and concessionary food assistance pro-
grams were essential during the years after the
devastation caused by World War II. Most national
economies of the world were near collapse. Rebuilding
Was the first priority; food and fiber were an im-
Mediate need. Most of war-torn Europe and the Far
East needed resources to expand agricultural pro-
duction.
Time, assistance, and a strong effort turned the
tide in Western Europe. Mining, manufacturing, mer-
chandising, and financial industries produced jobs,
Which in turn provided the basis for increased de-
Mand. Concessionary U.S. food and fiber exports gave
Way to exports for dollars.
U.S. agriculture can produce much more than we
ican consume at - home, and considerable efforts have
oeen directed to expanding sales of farm products
around the world. These efforts were directed, for the
Most pail, to making trade more desirable and more
economical and to making consumers in foreign
Markets more aware of the varieties of foods and
fiber's available to them. Even before the end of World
War II, negotiations were started to ease trade re-
strictions and lower tariffs.
During the early 1950's, world production of many
commodities continued to increase, buying power of
irnany countries increased, and competition became
Keen. Leaders in the various commodity organizations
became aware of the need to expand demand in the
World markets for basic U.S. farm commodities. These
coMmodity organizations, cooperating with the Foreign
Agricultural Service (FAS) of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, aggressively sought to expand the demand
for their products in many developed countries and in
Some developing countries where their products were
Il known. Market development expenditures have
ueen substantial. Although no specific measure of the
results of market development has been determined,
4111ch of the increase in agricultural exports since
World War II has Corresponded with the specific
efforts to expand trade through market development
a
ctivities.
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supermarket, Europeans, Asians, and others are
equally selective of their food products. Special market
needs must be met if U.S. farm products are to be
marketed successfully in foreign markets.
Financing Agricultural Export Sales
Commodity Credit Corporation Export Sales. The
availability of credit arrangements for foreign markets
also contributes to larger export sales. Credit sales
programs financed through the Commodity Credit Cor-
poration (CCC) provide a means to expand sales of U.S.
farm products to countries that cannot pay imme-
diately for the purchase. Many countries that use CCC
credit to purchase U.S. agricultural products could
not make such purchases or would purchase less with-
out credit arrangements. CCC credit is not intended to
displace cash sales, rather it is oriented to support,
maintain, expand, and develop new overseas markets
for U.S. agricultural commodities.
Through the CCC's Export Credit Sales Program,
commercial agricultural exports eligible for such as-
sistance may be financed for periods ranging from 6 to
36 months. The CCC charges commercial rates of
interest and requires an acceptable irrevocable letter
of credit. The specific agricultural products eligible for
CCC export financing vary, but are essentially
commodities that are in more than adequate supplY
and whose exports effectively utilize CCC credit to
expand exports.
The Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 authorizes a
new program regarding the use of intermediate credit
for commercial export sales. The Secretary of Agri-
culture can approve CCC financing that will develop,
expand, or maintain the importing nation as a foreign
market on a long-term basis without displacing normal
commercial sales. Under this arrangement, the CCC
May finance commodity exports for 3 to 10 years. The
intermediate credit financing may be made available to
WHAT IS MARKET DEVELOPMENT?
Even though it may include product promotion,
market development more often results in introducing
new products to areas where they were not found or
used before. Market development may introduce ways
to more efficiently use a product already in use to
increase its demand. Market development also in-
cludes working with foreign buyers, who represent the
processing and marketing industries of their countries,
and to strengthen the long-run demand of farm
products in foreign markets.
Emphasis on market development programs also
has helped American farmers to better understand
the importance of foreign markets and the importance
of providing these markets with reliable supplies. The
strengths of a good market development program are
(1) the reliability and integrity of the farmers and
exporters providing the products and (2) the govern-
ment's role in maintaining good trade relations.
ESSENTIALS FOR MARKET, DEVELOPMENT
American farmers know the importance of re-
sponding to the demands for their farm products. Their
ability to provide dependable supplies for the market is
essential to market development. Other factors include
acceptable pricing and financial arrangements,
quality, dependability, and integrity.
Dependable Supplies and Quality
Export marketing for farm products is not an oc-
casional thing. If American producers and exporters
plan to sell their products in foreign markets, they also
must plan to provide the markets with an adequate
supply of quality products of the variety desired by
foreign buyers. Just as American consumers are
selective in their purchases of food products at the
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establish reserve stocks consistent with international
trade agreements, the export sales of breeding stock,
and facilities to improve handling and marketing of
U.S. agricultural products by the importing nation and
to meet credit competition for agricultural export
sales.
Under the provisions of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974,
the U.S. government is prevented from extending ex-
Port credit to any country that does not provide
freedom of emigration to its citizens. However, coun-
tries with most-favored-nation (MFN) status are
exempt from the Trade Act restriction. Among the
socialist countries, for instance, Poland, Yugoslavia,
Romania, and Hungary have MFN status.
The Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 provides for
CCC financing of up to 3 years for commercial sales of
agricultural commodities from private stocks to the
People's Republic of China. These financing arrange-
ments may be provided under the short-term export
credit sales program or the new deferred payment
sales program for exporters. Under the deferred pay-
ment arrangement, exporters may provide deferred
Payment terms (up to 3 years) to foreign buyers to
meet sales competition from other nations or make
additional export sales.
Under the provisions of the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 480), the
United States encourages economic development in
developing countries, the combating of hunger and
Malnutrition, the expansion and development of export
Markets for U.S. agricultural products, and the
facilitation of U.S. foreign policy abroad. The principal
Programs of this Act are Title I agreements with
developing countries to provide for the sale of
agricultural products under long-term dollar or con-
vertible local currency credit sales for up to 40 years.
Title II programs provide for donations of food in about
80 countries mainly through U.S. private voluntary
°rganizations and the world food program through
school lunches and similar programs, and for food
needs resulting from natural disasters such as floods
and earthquakes.
As the United States continues to emphasize
growth in export sales, it also has had to emphasize the
availability of financial arrangements for increased
agricultural sales. Successful bilateral trade hinges on.
adequate financing and credit. For example, the in-
creased agricultural trade between the United States
and Eastern Europe has resulted in not only a sub-
stantial increase in the sales of agricultural products
to these countries, but a corresponding increase in out-
standing credits to these countries because of financial
arrangements.
In 1977 the countries of Eastern Europe and the
USSR imported almost $2 billion worth of U.S.
agricultural products, compared with less than $300
million before 1970. At the same time, -CCC credit
Programs to these Eastern European countries have ex-
'Most favored nation status means that the U.S. extends the same trading
Privileges (including tariff concessions) to these countries that it does to its
regular trading partners.
panded substantially. For instance, Poland, the second
largest recipient of credit among countries in the CCC
program, has purchased U.S. farm products under CCC
credit programs from 1962 to 1977 totaling $582.3
million. All credit lines were extended on 3-year
repayment terms.
Until recently, CCC credit was not available to
Hungary. However, before the passage of the 1974
Trade Act (1966 to 1974), Hungary received a $5.8
million line of credit for purchasing $1.4 million in
breeder animals and $4.4 million in grain sorghum.
Credit terms arranged were from 12 to 36 months. The
President recently declared Hungary eligible for CCC
credit, and as of July 7, 1978, the country also enjoys
MFN status.
Because the United States has extended credit to
these particular nations, the agricultural export
volume has expanded substantially. The concensus of
both the United States government and the bankers of
the United States and Western Europe appears to ex-
press confidence in the Eastern European governments
to continue to meet their financial commitments. On the
whole, commercial bankers continue to give Eastern
Europe a good credit rating.
The Export-Import Bank, an entirely U.S. govern-
ment-financed banking operation, finances and facili-
tates U.S. exports. It supplements and encourages but
does not compete with private banks in promoting ex-
port trade or engage in financing agricultural exports,
except $75 million of credit to Japan for its annual pur-
chase of U.S. cotton and some financing of cattle.
Ability to Respond to Competition in the Market
The U.S. farmer has been highly successful in ex-
porting agricultural products in the past, but this does
not assure continued success in the future. Although
much work has been done to expand U.S. agricultural
exports, much more needs to be done to continue to ex-
pand these markets. Three steps are important to con-
sider, even as market development efforts continue:
(1) U.S. farm products must be sold in the world
market at the going price.
(2) Production must be geared to world demand to
avoid a need for embargoes.
(3) The quality products demanded by the foreign
buyers must be produced and delivered.
Cooperation Among Commodity Organizations, FAS,
and Private Firms
U.S. farmers,. through their commodity organiza-
tions, benefit directly from market development
efforts. Most commodity organizations involved in ex-
porting cooperate with the Foreign Agricultural Ser-
vice (FAS), U.S. Department of Agriculture, in a
variety of market development and product promotion
activities.
FAS is and has been involved in many market
development and other export activities, but almost
always works with one of the cooperator commodity
organizations. Small and beginning export firms also
rely largely upon FAS assistance to promote their
products and to assist them in developing export
markets for their products.
FAS assists U.S. businesses in promoting foods and
other agricultural products in foreign markets. To
facilitate these efforts FAS has a staff of agricultural
attaches and officers in 61 American Embassies and
Consulates around the world. They are a key link in
gathering information on agricultural production,
trade, and market opportunities. They assist U.S.
business groups and individuals traveling abroad to
research possible foreign markets.
About 40 U.S. agricultural trade or commodity
associations cooperate with FAS to help develop or ex-
pand overseas markets for their respective products.
In programs sponsored, guided, and partially funded
by FAS, these cooperators provide basic initiative and
direction in undertaking a wide range of marketing and
promotional activities aimed at potential customers in
many foreign countries. The main goal of such a
program is to expand the market for the specific com-
modity in a specific country or area, but most often th 
promotional effort benefits the entire commodity in-
dustry in the United States and other producing coun-
tries as well.
The cooperating association conducts certain
specified market development activities aimed at
specific target groups. These groups may include
wholesalers, processors, retailers, and consumers.
The FAS agricultural attaches work with members of
similar associations or buyer groups in the foreign
country or area. Together they develop programs and
measure the effectiveness of the market development
and product promotion activities.
FAS supplies some of the initial funding for the
promotion of products designed to expand the export
sales. As the commodity organization develops in-
ternational cooperation and assistance and is able to
maintain its own funding, FAS assistance is reduced.
The export market can be a dependable, profitable
sales outlet for U.S. agricultural commodities and,
products. Quality products accompanied with effective
overseas promotion, market development, and con-
tinuing sales representation and follow-up can build a
permanent market for U.S. agricultural products and a
dependable source of farm income to help support
rural America's economy and the nation's balance of
trade.
POSSIBILITIES OF TRADE ARRANGEMENTS
'Trading occurs when both parties to a trade gain
or think they gain. If an individual or a country wants
to expand trade, all parties to the trade must hope that
they will be better off than they would without it. It
might not have been necessary to repeat that basic
point before discussing (1) commodity agreements, (2)
bilateral and multilateral trade negotiation, and (3)
food aid and concessionary exports. But, clearly, if any
of these mechanisms is to work in expanding
agricultural trade, the forces that lead to protec-
tionism must be pushed aside politically or
economically by expected gains.
Commodity Agreements
The success of the Organization of Petroleum Ek
porting Countries (OPEC) in raising crude oil prices
and influencing petroleum supply in world trade has
focused worldwide attention on commodity agree-
ments. This is the most spectacular example of how an
agreement among producers can influence price and
income to the advantage of one group at the expense of
another. Trade continues in this case because
porters have no obvious shorf-run alternatives that are
better. The success of OPEC over time, however, will
remain dependent on world supply-demand conditions
and how well gains from belonging to OPEC relate to
the potential of individual trading arrangements made
outside that system.
A successful commodity agreement requires a
number of important things to occur simultaneously:
(1) The number of producers must be small or con-
centrated so that supplies can be controlled.
(2) Leadership among producers must be effective
and generally acknowledged.
(3) Substitutes for the commodity must be few so
that demand is not eroded. _
(4) The commodity must be storable without im-
portant losses in quality.
(5) Consuming nations agree that a less competi-
tive market with reduced price swings 15
acceptable or in their own interest.
(6) Funding for the buffer stocks program and
for the manager of the agreement and his staff
is secure.
This list, incomplete as it is, suggests some of the
reasons why international commodity agreements are
easier to talk about than to practice. Effective leader-
ship and assured funding are requirements. If major
producers do not participate, the underlying mecha-
nisms will not work. Respect for market forces is a
necessity; otherwise the gains from trading outside the
agreement become very large. At some price, new pro-
duction will be encouraged and substitutes will appear.
Cheating by parties to the agreement, often precipi-
tated by shortfalls in production or oversupplies, can
be a substantial problem.
International commodity agreements for wheat,
coffee, cocoa, and sugar have been tried during the
last 30 years with mixed success. All these conl-
modifies are important to the United States. If an in-
ternational agreement is to work, this nation, as a
major buyer or seller or both, must be a party to the
program.
Agricultural commodities add a biological dimen-
sion to the functioning of an international agreement.
The weather, new technology, and disease and insect
problems all increase the likelihood that supplies
available for international trade may fluctuate widely.
A series of international wheat agreements were Put,
together between 1949 and 1970— An International
Wheat Council, based in London, was established to
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Carry out operations, collect market information, andkeep communications flowing between exporters and
Importers. A ,price range was established annually
Within which importing and exporting nations agreed
to buy and sell negotiated quantities of wheat eachI crop year. No buffer stocks program was developed,
because the United States and Canada in effect ac-,
cepted responsibility for this function through their
own national support program. When supplies becameSO great that the international floor price could not be
Maintained in 1969-70, exporters went their separate
Ways.
A wheat agreement negotiated in 1971 keeps the In-
ternational Wheat Council alive as a market in-
formation and communications defice for the 50 mem-ber nations. No agreement has been reached yet by
Participants on price ceilings and floors or for a meansfor handling buffer stocks or national stockpiles. With
so many nations involved and with such divergent
national interests to consider, the basis for any binding
Production controls is some time away. Trading in-
formation and keeping communications open between
Members are the current common denominators.
Leadership for a larger agreement has not emerged
among either exporters or importers.
Commodity agreements by their very nature are
not effective, direct mechanisms to expand trade of
American agricultural products. The agreements mayhave important indirect effects, however. Because we
are major buyers of many different commodities in
World markets, our stance on commodity agreements of
all kinds is always of interest to other countries. If we
appear to favor restricting supplies to raise prices in
the name of "market stabilization," some compensating
restriction or quota may well appear in a desired
Market as a natural response. Participation in effortsto obtain commodity agreements may be a necessary
Part of America's overall trade policy, particularly to
reduce the range of price fluctuation. Direct efforts to
expand trading possibilities are more likely to come
through other mechanisms.
%lateral and Multilateral Trade Negotiation
In the last 40 years, U.S. trade policy has developed
around three major mechanisms:
(1) The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.
(2) The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), negotiated and ratified by the Senate
in 1948.
(3) The Trade Expansion Acts of 1962 and 1974.
These instruments authorize the executive branch
tO negotiate with trading partners to reduce trade
barriers. Substantial progress has been made since the
1930's when high tariffs, export and import quotas, and
agricultural protectionism dominated. Reciprocal
trade agreements were a major breakthrough in the
1930's. In country after country we bargained to open
our markets to their goods in return for opportunities to
sell our products to them. In agriculture it was easiest
to start with noncompeting products where there were
advantages from trade to both sides. With .com-
il unication barriers broken and greater trust
established, the range of goods was widened so that
trade flows, particularly with Latin America, were in-
creased substantially before World War II.
The GATT was established immediately after
World War II to encourage increased world trade. It
set up an international code of behavior and actions
designed to give individual countries equal access to
markets. This General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
encouraged nations to negotiate with each other to
reduce tariff barriers and quotas or other trade
restrictions.
The basic principles are widely acclaimed but are
difficult to practice. Domestic policy and pressure from
producers in a number of countries have led to
violations of the basic agreement, particularly with
agricultural products.
The GATT continues to provide a public forum for
reexamining existing trading arrangements and
discussing restrictive actions when they are taken.
Most of the hard currency markets for agricultural
products, including the European Community and
Japan, are participants. The Europeans and Japanese
protect their own agricultural producers through a
complex system of trade barriers including variablelevies, quotas, export subsidies, and government pur-
chasing agencies: U.S. representatives at GATT in
Geneva, Switzerland, continue to negotiate to reduce
these barriers or discover ways to circumvent them.
The Trade Expansion Acts of 1962 and 1974
provide new initiatives to U.S. participation in GATT.
The "Kennedy Round" of trade talks with the European
Community after the 1962 Act was established sought
to break some of the long-standing deadlocks between
2
us and the Europeans. The same initiatives were
fostered by the Act in 1974 with an important focus on
Japan. Although the President can initiate these direct
negotiations with our principal, hard currency, trading
partners, Congress must approve any final agreement.
These Acts specifically provide for relief or com-
pensation if additional imports to the United States
cause "serious injury" to domestic producers. They
also increase types of retaliatory actions which the
United States can take in response to "unfair trade _
practices."
It is difficult to evaluate the impact of GATT and
the legislation designed to reduce barriers to trade
because we don't know what would have happened
without these initiatives. It is clear that barriers to
trade in manufactured goods and industrial products
are much less than they were in the first half of this
century. It is also clear that removing additional
barriers to trade in agricultural products is very dif-
ficult at present. Domestic food security and protected
markets for their farmers have high priority in
Western Europe and Japan. Support for domestic
protection from North American competition is
widespread. The greatest opportunities for expanding
sales of agricultural products in hard currency
markets are the production and delivery of non-
competitive items. Soybeans, for example, have essen-
tially no barriers to entry in Europe or Japan because
the capacity to produce oilseeds and vegetable protein
locally is so modest. Trade negotiations will help us to
keep the markets we have, but we should not expect
dramatic breakthroughs in the near future. Modest
gains may be made in greater penetration into Japan's
market for additional commodity groups because of its
chronic export surplus with the United States.
Food Aid and Concessionary Exports to LDC's
During most of the years since World War II, the
United States has provided various combinations of
technical assistance and food aid to a wide range of
poorer countries. With a wide range of motives behind
them, these programs were and are supported because
Congress and the American people think they are in
our own best interests.
Public Law 480 has provided the principal
authorization for most of these programs since it was
enacted in 1954. More than $25 billion of commodities
have been exported under these programs. There are
outright grants and donations through government
agencies and voluntary organizations. There have been
concessionary sales for foreign currencies which are
then loaned to businesspeople or made available to the
government within the country for technical assistance
and other programs. Direct sales have increased but
with long-term, low-interest loans financed by special
agencies in the United States. All of these expand the
physical volume of our agricultural exports. In many
years during the 1950's and 1960's, these efforts helped
to reduce government stocks acquired through Co'
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roodity Credit Corporation operations. In some cases as
developing countries could develop their own market
economies, concessionary sales and food aid developed
into hard currency transactions. Taiwan, South Korea,
Greece, Turkey, and a number of Latin American coun-
tries are examples of how this kind of market has de-
veloped because of P.L. 480.
We should consider technical assistance and con-
cessionary exports to developing countries on their
own merits, not as an important means to expand our
access to foreign markets for agricultural products.
Clearly, exports of wheat, rice, feed grains, and animal
Protein have important effects on prices and quantities
tn. oving in trade. The ways in which food aid is used in
Individual countries also have important effects on
local incentives to increase production, use new
technology, and develop agricultural distribution
Systems.
The primary concern of American producers and
agricultural exporters is for a known and reasonably
consistent policy with respect to P.L. 480 programs,
food aid, and disaster relief. These programs should
not be looked upon as ways to "unload surpluses" in
Years when stocks are accumulated and to stay out of
the market when stocks are short. At the margin,
regular export of these commodities has a positive ef-
fect on prices. In years when reserves throughout the
World are large, the net price increase is probably
quite small. In years when world stocks are small, the
marginal impact on price is important.
The preceding review suggests that expanding
rnarkets for American agricultural products through
international agreements, trade negotiations, and food
aid programs is not easy, but all these efforts are
collectively critical. We must maintain the markets we
have and create the best trading climate and attitude
Possible to foster new opportunities that will benefit
both our own producers and consumers.
7
OPPORTUNITIES TO MAINTAIN
AND EXPAND EXPORTS
Total world trade amounted to $991 billion in 1976.
World trade in agricultural products was $138 billion,
or 14 percent. The U.S. share of world agricultural ex-
ports in that year was 16.9 percent, or $22 billion. In
fiscal 1977, world trade in agricultural products was
$118 billion. The U.S. share was $24 billion, or 20 per-
cent.
Opportunities exist to expand U.S. agricultural
trade exports, but knowing which agricultural prod-
ucts are exported to which countries will help to set
the stage for understanding export markets.
Agricultural exports are sold through commercial
markets and through markets existing under U.S.
government-assisted programs. In fiscal 1977, com-
mercial exports were $22.5 billion, or 94 percent of
total U.S. agricultural exports. Those markets iden-
tified as commercial or hard currency markets fall into
four general groups: (1) the developed countries, in-
cluding Canada, Japan, and Western European coun-
tries, (2) the Communist group, including China and the
COMECON countries, which are Russia and Eastern
Europe, (3) the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), and (4) those cash markets in the
Third World or developing countries.
Sixty-five percent of U.S. exports went to the
developed countries in 1977 and 21 percent to the
developing countries. Approximately 7 percent of U.S.
commercial agricultural exports went to centrally
planned economies including Russia and China and the
remaining 7 percent to the 13 OPEC members.
The principal export products are grains and feeds
followed by oilseeds and products, livestock and
products, cotton, fruits, nuts, vegetables, un-
manufactured tobacco, and miscellaneous other
products. The major specific commodities exported are
corn, wheat, soybeans, and cotton. Table 1 shows the
export value according to area of destination. The
major export markets are Western Europe, Japan, the
U.S.S.R., and Canada.
Nearly all countries in the world have policies of
attempting to achieve self-sufficiency in food produc-
tion. The United States is one of a comparatively small
number of countries with a food surplus and a strong
interest in exporting agricultural products. Expansion
of exports to many of these countries will be affected
by their efforts to achieve greater food self-sufficiency.
On the positive side, increases in income and
population plus changes in food preferences offer a
potential for increasing exports. As income increases,
the demand for meat products and luxury foods
probably will increase. Export expansion in feed
grains to produce meat is possible. As retail food
distribution changes, the prepared food export market
might improve. The market for high quality prepared
foods is expected to expand in the developed countries
and OPEC, except Japan and Taiwan which tend to im-
port raw materials and complete the processing
domestically. Expansion of exports to the U.S.S.R. and
China will be highly dependent on weather conditions
and the political situation.
SUMMARY
Market development includes product promotion,
introduction of new products, and new ways of using
products. Essentials of market development involve
supplying products of consistent quality along with
credit arrangements with the capability of cooperation
among commodity organizations, Foreign Agricultural
Service, and private firms. Trade expansion may be 3c-
complished through commodity agreements, bilateral
and multilateral trade negotiation, and food aid and
concessionary exports. Opportunities to expand ex-
ports depends upon trade needs of recipient countries
as well as the political and economic situations. The
domestic food and trade policies of recipient nations
may be the major variables in expanding U.S. agricul-
tural exports.
TABLE 1. U.S. Agricultural Exports, value by
area and country, fiscal year 1977*
Developed countries
1977
Value
(1,000 Dollars)
•••••••••
Western Europe 
Japan 
Canada 
Destination unknown 
Israel 
Australia 
Republic of South Africa 
New Zealand 
AREA TOTAL
Less developed countries
AREA TOTAL
OPEC
Venezuela 
Algeria 
Saudi Arabia 
Iran 
Indonesia 
Nigeria 
Iraq 
Libya 
Kuwait 
United Arab Emirates 
Ecuador 
Gabon 
Qatar 
AREA TOTAL
COMECON, USSR, China
USSR 
Poland 
Romania 
Czechoslovalda 
German Democratic Republic 
Bulgaria 
Hungary 
China 
AREA TOTAL
WORLD TOTAL
$8,697,249
3,773,466
1,586,300
323,225
-28.753
93,520
58,560
28,891
$ 305,206
100,528
145,732
452,929
107,111
221,673
61,648
12,736
13,908
12,413
72,135
242
1,684
$1,063,418
311,770
117,545
88,136
35,154
3,952
26,019
1,152
$14,532,458
$ 4,804,681
$ 1,507.945
$212,644972.,21,5640
*Summarized from data in table 8, pp. 22-26, U.S. Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistical Report, Fiscal Year 1977, Economics, Statistics. and Cooperatives Servi
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., April 1978.
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